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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

1972]

ARncLE 50-

JuDGmENTs GENERALLY

CPLR 5003: Second Department requires the party who delayed final
judgment to suffer the monetary consequences.
It has long been held that interest upon damages should only be
awarded from the date of entry of the final judgment.71 In the recent
case of Trimboli v. Scarpaci Funeral Home, Inc.,7 2 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that when a defendant appeals from
an interlocutory decision fixing liability and obtains a stay of the portion
of the trial to ascertain damages, 73 the interest is computed from the date
of interlocutory judgment.7 4
In Trimboli, the defendant, upon interlocutory judgment assessing
liability, immediately appealed and obtained a stay of the remainder of
the trial. Although the defendant's liability was eventually upheld,75
the assessment of damages, totalling $41,000, was delayed for almost a
year.7 6 The defendant claimed that under New York law he should only
have been assessed interest from the date that the final monetary judgment was entered.
The appellate division rejected the defendant's argument, stating:
The intent of the statute awarding interest is to indemnify the
plaintiffs for the nonpayment of what is due to them. Hence, the
delay in the rendition of damages may properly be charged against
the party causing it, in considering the allowance of interest, and
the courts have followed this rule in applying the terms of the
77

statute.

Thus, the court was influenced by the optional nature of a stay of the
damages portion of the trial, which could have been continued while an
appeal on the liability portion could have been taken. 8
The purpose of the Second Department's decision is unmistakably
clear: 79 An individual must suffer the consequences of his actions. A
715 WK&-M
5003.01 (1971).
72 87 App. Div. 2d 386, 326 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't 1971).

73 CPLR 4011 states: "The court may determine the sequence in which the issues
shall be tried and otherwise regulate the conduct of the trial in order to achieve a
speedy and unprejudiced disposition of the matters at issue ......
74 37 App. Div. 2d at 389, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
75 Trimboli v. Scarpaci Funeral Home, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 1103, 313 N.Y.S.2d 984
(2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
70 The interlocutory judgment was entered Oct. 28, 1969, while the judgment for
damages was entered Sept. 21, 1970.
77 37 App. Div. 2d at 389, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
78 "Without the stay the plaintiffs' damages would have been quickly ascertained
before the same jury which decided the issue of liability or another jury speedily convened."
Id. at 388, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
79 An additional issue was encountered in this case. The appellate division upheld
a 7!% interest rate on all damages. Id. at 389-90, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 230-32. This is in
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defendant who causes delay in the formulation of a final judgment, will
not be permitted to use this delay as an excuse for not paying interest
during that time. He who procrastinates in the Second Department is
now on notice that he will pay for the privilege.
ARTIcLE

52

-

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5240: Protectingthe abused judgment debtor.
All too often, pursuant to CPLR 5235, a levy of execution is made
against the residence of an ignorant small judgment debtor who, although admittedly at fault for nonpayment of his debt, is nonetheless
being treated with such indignity that he is, in effect, deprived of due
process of law. 80 Subsequent to the sheriff's levy, the debtor's property is
sold at public auction at a mere fraction of its fair market value. 81
Had the debtor been counselled by an attorney at any time prior to the
actual sale, such judicial abuses would never have materialized.8 2 But
even assuming that such has not been the case, and further assuming
that the debtor's property has already been sold pursuant to CPLR
5236, there still exists legal remedies available to the judgment debtor
under CPLR 5240. Thereunder, the court may at any time, upon motion or on its own initiative, make any order regarding any enforcement
proceeding of the CPLR. The court may deny, limit, condition, regulate, extend or modify the use of any enforcement proceeding of the
83
CPLR.
A recent example of a court's willingness to aid the abused judgment debtor subsequent to the sheriff's sale of his residence was a refusal
to sanction a deviation from the statutory norm of CPLR 5235. In Community Capital Corp. v. Lee,84 a declaratory judgment action in which,
had the sale been allowed, the plaintiff-buyer would have "come into
a present equity of $13,000 for the paltry sum of $197.25," the court,
apparent disagreement with the finding in a recent federal decision, applying New York
law, allowing only 6% interest on tort recoveries. Caldecott v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
417 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1969). See also The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOhN'S L. Rv.145, 164
(1970); The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 340 (1969).
80 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 153-54 (1970).

81 CPLR 5235 provides for restoration of the expired lien value of a judgment until
the mechanics of CPLR 5236 have been finalized. It is important that the debtor understand exactly the action being taken against him. CPLR 5236 eliminates the equity of
redemption, thereby preventing the judgment debtor from reaching the property subsequent
5236.02.
to its sale. See 6 WK&M
82 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 154 (1970). See Cook v. H.R.H.
Constr. Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 806, 302 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1969), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 532, 574 (1970).
5240.02.
83 See 6 WK&M
84 58 Misc. 2d 34, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JoHN's L Rav. 688, 702 (1969).

